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THE AMY JACKSON LAW' - A LOOK AT THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NORTH CAROLINA'S ANSWER TO
MEGAN'S LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that a house next to you in your neighborhood is
empty and a "for sale" sign is in the yard. You and your family
live in a nice area of town where there is little crime. In most
instances, you would have some anxiety about the type of people
that could potentially live in this home. You might be wondering
if they will be friendly, if your children will play together. It
would be highly unlikely, however, that your worry would be
whether this new neighbor will be a convicted sex offender.
However, this has occurred many more times than people
wish to admit. One of the most famous cases regarding an
unknown sex offender as a neighbor is that of Megan Kanka, who
was sexually assaulted and then murdered by her neighbor, a convicted sex offender, on July 29, 1994.2 In response to the public
outcry, New Jersey enacted legislation on October 31, 1994, mandating notification to communities when certain convicted sex
offenders take up residence nearby.3
New Jersey, however, is not the first nor the only state to
enact legislation concerning convicted sex offenders. California
has required sex offenders to register since the mid-1940's. 4
North Carolina, in response to the great number of convicted sex
offenders and out of public concern for repeat crimes by released
offenders, enacted the Amy Jackson Law. 5 This piece of legisla1. This law was named by North Carolina senator Hugh Webster in honor of
an eleven year old Caswell County girl who was killed in July 1995 by Archie
Billings, who had a previous record for assault and secret peeping. Bill Requires
Sex Offenders to Register, Greensboro News & Record (Greensboro, North
Carolina), July 20, 1995, at B2.
2. Patricia Petrucelli, Comment, Megan's Law: Branding the Sex Offender or
Benefiting the Community?, 5 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 1127 (1995).
3. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8 (West 1995).
4. Mary Lynne Vellinga, Crackdown on Sex Offenders Raises Tough

Questions, The Sacramento Bee (Sacramento, California), February 2, 1997, at
Al.
5. The original registration act was found at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-208.5 to 208.13 (Supp. 1995). This act was made ineffective by N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14208.5 to -208.15 (Supp. 1997) (effective April 1, 1998). The current act contains
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tion recognizes the potential for recidivism of sex offenders after
supervision is terminated and provides for a Tegistry to facilitate
communication between law enforcement agencies and for the
protection of the citizens of North Carolina.6
In every state in America there have been reports of convicted
sex offenders repeating their crimes with new victims. While
there have not been many cases to receive the publicity that the
Megan Kanka case did, other states have recently realized a growing need for similar legislation designed to protect their citizens
from dangers in the community. North Carolina, for example,
convicts nearly 1,100 sex offenders each year and releases 800
from prison.7 Just recently, the local news in Wake County, North
Carolina reported that a convicted sex offender who had been
released from a North Carolina prison in May 1997 had been
arrested on Thursday, August 21, 1997 for yet another sex offense
perpetrated on young boys."
This comment will first explore the complexities of North Carolina's Amy Jackson Law. Second, it will discuss the statutory
response to sex offender recidivism by other states as compared to
North Carolina, with a focus on New Jersey. This will include an
analysis on the constitutionality of these statutes. Finally, the
comment will review any expected ramifications, both legal and to
the community, of this North Carolina legislation.
II.

THE AMY JACKSON LAW: NORTH CAROLINA'S SEXUAL
OFFENDER REGISTRATION STATUTE 9

A.

Purpose Behind Statute"°

The North Carolina "Sexual Offender Registration Program"
statutes were implemented:
to assist law enforcement agencies' efforts to protect communities

by requiring persons who are convicted of sex offenses or of certain
other offenses committed against minors to register with law
an offenses against minors registration requirement, a sexual predator
registration requirement and a juvenile registry that were not contained in the
prior law. Both of these new registration requirements are beyond the scope of
this comment. See CriminalLaw Survey, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. - (1998).
6. § 14-208.5.
7. Linda Gunter, Editorial, Registering Sex Offenders, The News and
Observer (Raleigh, North Carolina), July 2, 1994, at A15.
8. Channel 17 Morning News (NBC television broadcast, August 22, 1997).
9. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-208.5 to -208.15 (Supp. 1997).
10. § 14-208.5.
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enforcement agencies, to require the exchange of relevant information about those offenders among law enforcement agencies,
and to authorize the access to necessary and relevant information
about those offenders to others .... 11
Said the New Jersey Supreme Court of the need for such a
law: "In cases of sex offenders, as compared to other criminals,
the propensity to commit crimes does not decrease over time."1 2
Rather, registration statutes such as this are deemed necessary
13
because there is a high rate of recidivism among sex offenders.
Although the purpose behind the registration statutes is purportedly clear - to better protect communities, and assist in the investigation and apprehension of sex offenders - critical to the
constitutionality of these laws is that the effect of the statutes is
regulatory rather than punitive. 1 4 This will be further examined
in Sections III and IV.
B.

5

Those Required to Register1

There are two requirements for having to register under the
sexual offender statutes in North Carolina: 1) the person must be
a resident of the State; and 2) the person must have a reportable
conviction.' 6 Reportable convictions include offenses against
minors 7 and sexually violent offenses.'" A sexually violent
offense is a final conviction for first degree rape, 19 second degree
rape,2 ° first degree sexual offense, 2 ' second degree sexual
offense, 22 attempted rape or sexual offense, 23 intercourse and sex11. § 14-208.5.
12. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 364 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1995).
13. Id.
14. State v. Costello, 643 A.2d 531 (N.H. 1994).
15. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.7 (Supp. 1997).
16. § 14-208.7.
17. § 14-208.6(ld). Offenses against minors are kidnapping, § 14-39,
abduction of children, § 14-41, and felonious restraint, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-43.3
(1993).
18. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6(5) (Supp. 1997).
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2 (1993).
20. § 14-27.3.
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.4 (Supp. 1997).
22. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.5 (1993).
23. § 14-27.6. (This offense is still enumerated in the list of reportable
convictions, but § 14-27.6, which sets forth the elements for the crime, has been
repealed. 1994 N.C. SEss. LAws 14).
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25
ual offense with certain victims,2 4 incest between near relatives,

employing or permitting a minor to assist in offenses against public morality and decency,26 first degree sexual exploitation of a
minor

27

second degree sexual exploitation of minor,28 third degree

sexual exploitation of a minor,29 promoting prostitution of a
minor, ° participating in prostitution of a minor,3 ' or taking indecent liberties with children.32 Also, if a resident of North Carolina
has a final conviction in another state that would have been a
reportable conviction in North Carolina, that too will meet the
requirements of registration. 3
34

Time and Place of Registration
If a convicted sex offender falling into one of the above categories moves into North Carolina from another state, he has ten (10)
days from establishing residency in which to register.3 5 A person
currently residing in North Carolina has ten (10) days from his
release from any penal institution or arrival in any county to register, or, if imprisonment was not mandated by the court, registration must occur immediately following conviction. 6 An individual
must register with the sheriff of the county in which the offender
resides, and registration is maintained for a period of ten (10)
years.3 7
C.

D. Required Information3"
The registration form requires information such as the
offender's name, aliases, date of birth, sex, race, address, the type
24. § 14-27.7. Certain victims are persons assuming a parental role, persons
having custody of a child, and agents or employees of any persons or institutions
(private, charitable, or governmental) having custody of a child.
25. § 14-178.
26. § 14-190.6.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.16 (Supp. 1997).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.17 (1993).
29. § 14-190.17A.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.18 (Supp. 1997).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.19 (1993).
32. § 14-202.1.
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.6 (Supp. 1997).
34. § 14-208.7.
35. § 14-208.7(a).
36. § 14-208.7(a). Alternatively, the person is to register whenever the person
has been present in the North Carolina for 15 days, whichever is first.
37. § 14-208.7(a).
38. § 14-208.7(b).
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of offense for which convicted,

date of conviction, sentence

imposed, photograph (taken at the time of registration) and fingerprints.3 9 This information is sent to the Division of Criminal
Statistics of the Department of Justice.4 ° Copies are to be main-

tained by the sheriff in order to compile a county registry.4 1
E. Must Notify Offender of Duty to Register42

Before a convicted sex offender is released from a penal institution, he is to be notified by an official of the institution of his
duty to register.4 3 If imprisonment is not required, the sentencing
court is responsible for notifying the defendant of the duty to register.44 The statutes also contain a provision requiring an
offender to notify officials if he changes his address, so that this
information may be forwarded to the Division of Criminal
Statistics.4 5
F.

4
General Public Entitled to Access RegistrationInformation 1

A central issue with regard to registration statutes and the
focus of this Comment is who should be entitled to access this
information. The North Carolina Act provides that the offender's
name, sex, address, physical description, picture, conviction date,
offense, and sentence are all public record and shall be available
for public inspection. 47 Anyone may obtain a copy of an offender's
registration form to learn if a particular individual is a registered
sex offender. 48 To do so, the requester must simply give to the
sheriff a written request form.49 If the requester so desires, the
requester may even obtain a copy of the entire county registry.5 °
39. § 14-208.7(b).
40. § 14-208.7(c).
41. § 14-208.7(c).
42. § 14-208.8.
43. § 14-208.8(a)(1).
44. § 14-208.8(b).
45. § 14-208.9.
46. § 14-208.10.
47. § 14-208.10(a).
48. § 14-208.10(b).
49. § 14-208.10(b). The prior registration act required the requester to
provide certain information about the offender in order to obtain the registration
form, such as a name, sex, and physical description. No such requirements are
contained in the new act.
50. § 14-208.10(b).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1998

5

Campbell
Law Review,LAW
Vol. 20,REVIEW
Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 5
CAMPBELL

352

Anyone may also
internet. 1

[Vol. 20:347

search the registration registry via the

52
G. Failingto Register is a Crime
53
An offender who fails to register is guilty of a Class F felony.
With the North Carolina sexual offender registration statutes
in mind, this Comment will now take a narrow look at one particular constitutional question that has arisen in other jurisdictions:
whether it is constitutional to require previously convicted sex
offenders to register in conformance with the state statutes. To
begin the process, we will first look at the constitutional analysis
under the ex post facto clause followed by the statutory responses
by the varying states.

III.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION STATUTES

Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution forbids
the states from enacting any ex post facto law. 54 One of the most
often cited challenges to the new registration statutes asserted by
convicted sex offenders is that the law contravenes this prohibition against ex post facto laws. This is arguably so because the
statutes apply retroactively, thereby requiring previously convicted sex offenders to register, as well as those who have been
convicted since the statutes were enacted. The reasoning behind
requiring previously convicted sex offenders to register, however,
is so that the registration will have an immediate and beneficial
impact. "[I]f the law did not apply to previously convicted offenders, notification would provide practically no protection now, and
relatively little in the near future."55
The Supreme Court has provided the basis for a proper ex
post facto analysis. "[A] law violates the ex post facto prohibition
if it 'changes the punishment, and inflicts a greaterpunishment,
51. North CarolinaSex Offender & PublicProtectionRegistry (visited April 8,
1998) <http://sbi.jus.state.nc.us/sor/>. This internet sight first appeared on April
1, 1998, and in the first week of its existence more than 200,000 searches were
performed.
52. § 14-208.11.
53. § 14-208.11(a).
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
55. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 373 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1995).
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than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.' 56 The
Court set forth three elements to establish if a particular law violates the ex post facto clause: if it "1) punishes as a crime an act
previously committed, which was innocent when done; 2) makes
more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; or 3) deprives one charged with a crime of any defense available according to the law at the time the act was committed."5 7
The real question stemming from the constitutional attacks is
whether requiring registration by sex offenders who were convicted prior to the statutory enactment is an additional punishment for that crime and therefore'a violation of the constitutional
prohibitions against ex post facto laws. The ex post facto analysis
herein will focus on the Supreme Court's second element whether registration makes the punishment for a crime after its
commission more burdensome.
In order to determine if the statute is punishment, a court
must first look to the intent of the legislature.5" Where the intent
cannot be clearly determined, a court must use the factors set
forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez." If, on the other hand,
the intent is clearly non-punitive, then the court must determine
if any punitive effect of the statute negates the intent of the
legislature.6 °
In order to analyze how other states have handled such
inquiries, it is first necessary to illustrate the different types of
registration statutes. As a result of the passage of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 6 ' and in response to
56. State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1067 (Wash. 1994) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. 386, 390 (1798)) (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 390.
59. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). The factors are:
[1] (w)hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
[2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3]
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution
and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and [71 whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
Id.
60. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1068.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994). This is typically called the Jacob Wetterling
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act. It
requires sex offenders to register a current address with a state agency for 10

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1998

7

354

Campbell
Law Review,LAW
Vol. 20,REVIEW
Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 5
CAMPBELL

[Vol. 20:347

public outcry,6 2 many states have enacted legislation dealing with
sex offenders.6 3 These statutes vary as to their scope and effect.
The various state statutes fall into three basic categories. First,
there is legislation that requires the offender to register, but only
allows the information to be released to law enforcement agencies.
Next, there are statutes which allow for limited access to the
information by some segments of the public. Finally, there are
statutes that allow for some type of notification, which span from
64
allowing the public to access this information through writing,
to requiring law enforcement to notify neighbors and school officials, 65 to requiring the offender to notify persons in the community themselves. 66 Each of these types will be outlined below.
A.

Access Only to Law Enforcement

The underlying reason for enacting laws requiring the registration of sex offenders is to enable law enforcement to quickly
apprehend such offenders if recidivism occurs, thus promoting
public protection. Therefore, as many as eighteen states as of
1996 had enacted legislation permitting only law enforcement offi67
cials access to the information provided by these sex offenders.
New Hampshire, for example, does not allow the release of information to the public because the information is considered confidential within law enforcement.6
years after conviction or release. It also contains a provision providing for public
notification and requires states to enact registration programs. This statute also
permits information which is collected pursuant to this statute to be disclosed for
"any purpose permitted under the laws of the state." § 14071(e).
62. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
63. Michelle Pia Jerusalem, Note, A Framework for Post-Sentence Sex
Offender Legislation: Perspectives on Prevention, Registration, and the Public's
Right to Know, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 219, 222 (1995).
64. North Carolina is an example of this type of notification. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-208.10(a) (1995).
65. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c)(3) (West 1994).
66. La. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542(B)(2) (West 1995).
67. Gregory C. Pavildes and Denise B. Pavildes, Sex Offender Registration
and Community Notification, in PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF SEX CRIMES 18-1,

18-14 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. eds., 1996). The eighteen states listed are:
Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
68. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 632-A:17 (1992). The offender may also obtain a
copy if they request the information.
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In New Hampshire v. Costello,6 9 the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire held that requiring a convicted sex offender to register
with local law enforcement "did not violate the constitutional provisions against ex post facto laws."7 ° The defendant had been convicted in Massachusetts and his probation was subsequently
transferred to New Hampshire where the sex offender registration
statute operated retrospectively to the defendant.7 1 The defendant failed to register after being advised of his duty to do so, and a
misdemeanor complaint was filed against him.7 2 The defendant
argued that application of the statute violated the prohibitions
against ex post facto laws under the State and Federal Constitutions. 73 The court stated that '[elven though the law may disadvantage the defendant, unless it also provides greater
74
punishment, its application to him is not ex post facto."
In line with proper ex post facto analysis the court first
turned to the purpose of the statute and found that it was clearly
regulatory. 5 In determining the effect of the statute, the court
stated that if a statute has both a regulatory and punitive effect
the statute will be construed as regulatory as long as that was the
"evident purpose of the legislature."76 The court stated that the
overriding purpose of enacting the law was regulatory and that
the punitive effect, if any, was "de minimis."7 7 Therefore, since no
greater punishment was conferred upon the defendant, there was
no ex post facto violation.
In Illinois v. Adams,78 involving an Illinois registration
scheme, a defendant claimed that the registration requirement

69. 643 A.2d 531 (N.H. 1994).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. The Constitution of the United States prohibits
legislation from being enacted which proscribes punishment for an act which was
not punishable when the act was committed or which increases the amount of
punishment for the crime at the time it was committed. The specific argument
for why requiring sex offenders to register should violate the ex post facto clause
of the Constitution are beyond the scope of this article.
71. Costello, 643 A.2d at 532.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 532-33.
75. Id. at 533.
76. Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95-96 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
77. Costello, 643 A.2d at 533.
78. 581 N.E.2d 637 (Ill. 1991).
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constituted cruel and unusual punishment 7 9 under the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.8 0 The court began
its Eighth Amendment inquiry the same as a court would for an
ex post facto analysis - by looking at the intent of the legislature.81 "Specifically, the legislature sought to create an additional
method of protection for children from the increasing incidence of
sexual assault and sexual abuse."8 2 The court declined to consider
the Mendoza factors because the legislative intent was clear on its
face. "[T]he intent with respect to the Registration Act is clearly
non-penal in nature, focusing not on the burden to any particular
defendant, but rather on the advantages given to law enforcement
agencies in the protection of children."83
The defendant, however, argued that registration is punitive
because it will make him more susceptible to police questioning
when a sex offense occurs.8 4 The court rejected this, noting that
the defendant had not lost any of his constitutional rights and
these rights "will still be in place to protect him from unwarranted
police harassment."8 5 Also assisting the court was the fact that
the statutes did not attempt to correct the behavior of sex offenders.8 6 Its purpose was clearly for assisting law enforcement agencies and protecting the public. Based on these findings the court
concluded that the Registration Act did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 8
In both Adams and Costello, the registration information was
to be held confidential by law enforcement agencies. Said the Illinois court in Adams, "the law enforcement community is prohibited from disseminating the information to the public at large on
pain of criminal sanctions."8 9 The Illinois court reasoned that
because this information is not passed on to the general public,
79. The defendant also claimed that the registration requirement denied
equal protection and due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
81. Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 640.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 641.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 641.
88. Id.
89. Id.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol20/iss2/5
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"no stigma attaches"9" and therefore the statute failed to impose
the "cruel" aspect of cruel and unusual punishment. 9 ' The New
Hampshire court in Costello did not dwell on the confidentiality
issue. However, by limiting offender information to law enforcement officials the regulatory end of assisting law enforcement was
met. Widespread dissemination, on the other hand, seems more
intrusive to the offender while at the same time losing connection
to the stated goal. Thus, it seems that a limited release of information is a helpful tool in withstanding constitutional attack.
B.

States with Limited Access by the Public

The next type of statute is one that only allows access to a
limited portion of society. This is also consistent with the underlying goals of the registration requirements, in that the information
is given to agencies or entities such as schools and day care facilities. For example, Indiana's statute provides that the sex offender
registry shall be available on a computer disk.9 2 The statute does
not specifically address whether this information is confidential to
the public at large; it does specify that a hard copy of the registry
is to be provided to the following agencies:
1) all school corporations; 2) all nonpublic schools; 3) a state
agency that licenses individuals who work with children; 4) the
state personnel department to screen individuals who may be
hired to work with children; 5) all child care facilities licensed by
or registered in the state of Indiana; and 6) all other93entities that:
provide services to children or request the registry.
While the latter part of the statute appears somewhat vague
as to public access, the use of the word "entity" does not apply to
individuals and does not provide for release of this information
except for agency usage.
Another example of this type of statute is in Delaware, where
employers who plan to hire someone in a child-related job can find
out if that particular person is on the registry.9 4 However, other
information on the registry is confidential and is accessible only to
law enforcement officials. 9 5 As noted earlier, these type of statutes, like those where the public is given no access to registration
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
IND. CODE § 5-2-12-11 (1994).
§ 5-2-12-11.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4120 (Supp. 1996).
§ 4120.
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information, seem to be more consistent with the goals behind
registration of sex offenders: protection of that portion of the public in which the offender may have direct contact with children.97
Two cases, Arizona v. Noble96 and Washington v. Ward
show how a "limited access" statute plays a part in an ex post
facto challenge. In Noble,98 the Supreme Court of Arizona
addressed the question of whether requiring an offender to register as a sex offender under a statute that was not in effect at the
time he committed his offense violated the prohibition against ex
post facto laws of the Federal and State Constitutions. Vacating
the court of appeals' decision, the court held that the sex offender
registration statute was regulatory and therefore constitutional.
In reaching this decision, the court examined the prohibitions laid
out in Calder v. Bull 99 to determine if the Arizona statute enacted
a "law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed." 10 0
The court first determined that the law had a retrospective application to the defendant, which in fact was "directly contrary to a
primary purpose of the ex post facto clause -'to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to
rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.'"' 101
The case then centered on the issue of whether the statute
constituted punishment. To begin its ex post facto analysis, the
court began with a look into the legislative purpose - "whether the
legislative aim was to punish [an] individual for past activity, or
whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant
incident to a regulation of a present situation."' °2 If the intent
was found to be non-punitive, the inquiry would continue to determine whether the statute had such a punitive effect as to negate
0 3
the regulatory legislative purpose.1
In Noble, the legislative history did not yield a discernable
answer, so the court turned to the Mendoza factors. 10 4 These factors have been utilized in cases where the court determines that
96. 829 P.2d 1217 (Ariz. 1992).
97. 869 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1994).
98. 829 P.2d 1217.
99. 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
100. Id. at 390.
101. Noble, 829 P.2d at 1220 (citing Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29
(1981)).
102. Id. at 1221 (quoting De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960)).
103. Id.
104. See supra note 59.
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the legislative intent is unclear. 10 5 The court weighed and analyzed four of the Mendoza factors finding that: registration was
not an affirmative disability or restraint; registration has traditionally been viewed as punitive, although in this case limiting
public access to the registration information lessened its harsh/
punitive effect; the registration requirement served, at least somewhat, as a deterrent, which is a traditional aim of punishment;
and, finally, the legitimate purpose of registration was not outweighed by any limited punitive impact. 10 6 The court gave the
most weight to the legitimate legislative purpose. Without providing analysis on how the other factors were weighed, the court held
that the statute did not constitute punishment and did not contravene the ex post facto clause of either the Federal or State
10 7
Constitutions.
Furthermore, reasoning that each individual still holds his
constitutional rights, the court rejected defendant's argument that
registration would subject him to harsher punishment under the
laws. "Registration assists law enforcement officers in locating
past sex offenders when new crimes are committed, but registration does not, and could not, diminish registrants' general right to
be free from unconstitutional law enforcement practices." 0 8 The
court did, however, qualify its holding to state that the statute is
not excessive in relation to offenses of child molestation and sexual misconduct with a minor. It elected not to consider the "excessiveness" question in relation to other offenses. 1°9
In Washington v. Ward 10 the Supreme Court of Washington
faced the same issue of whether the retroactive application of the
sex offender registration statute violated the constitutional
prohibitions against ex post facto laws. This court, like the Noble
court, recognized that the central issue was "whether the law
alters the standard of punishment which existed under prior
law.""' The court found that the statute was retroactive and
began its ex post facto analysis by examining the legislative
purpose.

112

105. Noble, 829 P.2d at 1221.

106. Id. at 1222-23.
107. Id. at 1224.
108. Id. at 1223.

109. Id. at 1224.
110. 869 P.2d 1062.
111. Id. at 1068.
112. Id. at 1067.
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Unlike the Arizona legislature, the Washington legislature
had clearly set forth its purpose: to assist law enforcement agencies in their efforts to protect the community. 1 13 Despite the clear
intent, however, the next question faced by the court was
"whether the actual effect of the statute [was] so punitive as to
negate the Legislature's regulatory intent."11 4 The court turned to
the Mendoza factors to help decipher whether the effect of the
statute was regulatory or punitive. The court noted that these
factors are traditionally utilized when the intent of the legislature
is unclear, but nevertheless applied four (4) of the factors in favor
of a finding that the Washington statute was regulatory and not

punitive. 115
The court found that since the statute limited the dissemination of information to the public, it did not impose any additional
punishment. The Washington statute stated that "[plublic agencies are authorized to release relevant and necessary information
regarding sex offenders to the public when the release of the information is necessary for public protection."' 1 6 The court held "that
a public agency must have some evidence of an offender's future
dangerousness, likelihood of re-offense, or threat to the community, to justify disclosure to the public in a given case. This statutory limit ensured that disclosure occurred to prevent future
harm, not to punish past offenses. 1 17 Important here is that the
information is only disseminated to the public if there is a legitimate threat to community safety. Further, the Washington statute applies only to felony sex offenders11 ' and limits the proximity
in which the information will be released -the closer the offender,
the more information provided." 9 The court concluded that "the
appropriate dissemination of relevant and necessary information
does not constitute punishment for purposes of ex post facto
analysis." 2 o
The Ward court, when considering deterrence as punishment,
noted that the actual conviction and punishment might be the
deterrence rather than the registration requirement. However,
113. Id. at 1068.
114. Id. (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
115. Id. at 1069-74.
116. Ward, 869 P.2d. at 1070 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.550(1) (Supp.
1998)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1072.
119. Id. at 1071.
120. Id. at 1072 (emphasis added).
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even if registration were a deterrent, the court held that the
effects were not punitive given its primary effect of aiding law
12 1
enforcement agencies and protecting the public.
Lastly, the court, again examining the Mendoza factors,
determined that the registration statute was not excessive in relation to its purpose. It noted, as did the Noble court, that offenders
express concern over being a prime suspect in every sex crime
investigation. However, consistent with Noble, the court stated
122
that the offender still retained all of his constitutional rights.
"While a known sex offender living in a community where another
sex offense occurs may well be a suspect, he has all of the due
process and constitutional protections enjoyed by any other citizen
1 23
and cannot be arrested simply because of his past conviction.
The court concluded that retroactive application of the statute was
not punishment and therefore there was no violation of the
prohibitions against ex post facto laws. 1 24 "Although a registrant
may be burdened by registration, such burdens are an incident of
the underlying conviction and are not punitive for purposes of ex
post facto analysis." 2 5
C. Statutes Allowing Broad Public Access to Information
While the states discussed in section B of this article give
access to certain information, this is mostly limited to agencies
that work with or around children or the elderly. The states that
have statutes authorizing some form of unlimited access to the
public have aroused controversy in recent years. While some proponents of these statutes argue that people have a right to know
when a convicted sex offender moves into their neighborhood and
demand that legislation of this type be adopted, 26 others fear that
public access will lead to vigilantism and vandalism, 2 7 or that the
statute will be declared unconstitutional.
Perhaps the most debated sex offender registration and notification statute in America is New Jersey's Megan's Law, which
was enacted a few months after the highly publicized murder of a
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
19.

Id. at 1073.
Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073.
Id.
Id. at 1074.
Id.
Jerusalem, supra note 63 at 220.
Report Reveals Little Harassment, Portland Oregonian, April 9, 1995 at
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young New Jersey girl by a convicted sex offender. 128 This is perhaps the most comprehensive sex offender statute in the United
States and has been the subject of widespread debate and litigation, because law enforcement is actually required to notify the
public concerning certain sex offenders.129
1.

The New Jersey Statute

After the death of Megan Kanka, the recidivism of child sexual abusers was thrust into the limelight. The state of New
Jersey reacted quickly, finding that the danger of recidivism of sex
offenders mandated that a system of registration be implemented
to protect the public and to assist law enforcement in "preventing
and promptly resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and
missing persons." 3 ' The statute required that anyone who has
been "convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found not guilty by reason of insanity for commission of a sex offense" is required to register. 1 3 ' A sex offense under this statute was defined as
aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal
sexual assault, endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in
sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the morals of the
child, endangering the welfare of a child, luring or enticing, or
attempt of these above enumerated crimes.'32 It also included
criminal restraint, kidnapping, and false imprisonment if the victim is a minor.13 3 The offender was required to register upon
release from incarceration, relocation from another state, or after
a conviction where an active sentence was not imposed.13 4 The
statute also provides that a person previously convicted, but not
presently incarcerated or subject to supervision 35 may be
36
required to register.
128. Petrucelli, supra note 2 at 1127.
129. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c)(3) (West 1994).
130. § 2C:7-1.
131. § 2C:7-2(b)(2).
132. § 2C:7-2(b)(2).
133. § 2C:7-2(b)(2). For false imprisonment to apply the victim must be a
minor and the offender is not the parent of the victim.
134. § 2C:7-2(c).
135. This means that a person previously convicted, who was not in prison or
subject to the restrictions of probation or parole may still be required to register.
This would seem to leave the statute vulnerable to an ex post facto attack.
136. § 2C:7-2(c).
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The New Jersey statute departed from most state statutes by
requiring notification to the public of certain offenders. 1 37 The
offenders were classified into one of three categories contingent
upon their potential for recidivism. 13 This was determined by
factors which include, but are not limited to:
1) conditions of release that minimize risk of re-offense such as
supervised probation, parole, counseling, or a structured home
that provides guidance; 2) physical factors such as age or illness;
3) criminal history factors indicating a high risk of re-offense
which include: a. whether the behavior was characterized by
repetitive and compulsive behavior, b. whether the maximum
term was served, and, c. whether the offense was against a child;
4) other criminal factors including, a. relationship between the
offender and the victim, b. whether the offense involved violence,
and, c. the number, date and nature of prior offenses; 5) whether
psychiatric profile indicates a potential for recidivism; 6) offender's
response to treatment, 7) recent behavior, including behavior
while under supervision and in the community; and 8) recent
139
expressions of intent to commit a future crime.
Based upon these and other factors, a determination was then
made about the potential recidivism of the particular offender.
This information was used to determine the scope of notification. 140 If the risk were low, then only law enforcement agencies
likely to encounter the subject were notified; but if the risk were
41
moderate or high, the number of persons notified increased.'
Under moderate risk guidelines, certain agencies such as schools,
religious, and youth organizations were notified,' 4 2 while under
high risk guidelines the public was to be notified where persons
were likely to come in contact with the offender.' 43 The prosecutor
in the county where the offender resides determines the risk of reoffense after consulting with local law enforcement."44
2.

Litigation of Megan's Law

Even with its varying degrees of disclosure and notification,
Megan's law has been subject to much litigation. One of the most
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

§ 2C:7-6.
§ 2C:7-8(c).
§ 2C:7-8(3-8).
§ 2C:7-8(c).
§ 2C:7-8(c)(1).
§ 2C:7-8(c)(2).
§ 2C:7-8(c)(8)(3).
§ 2C:7-8(d)(2).
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visible cases, Doe v. Poritz,145 found the registration statute
constitutional.
In Doe, 146 the defendant challenged Megan's Law under several different theories.*a y First, the defendant claimed that the
public exposure of his home address, together with other information provided in the registry, was a violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process rights."a All of the information on the
registry was a matter of public record, but the information was not
readily accessible and would have taken great efforts to compile,
since it was located in different places. 14 9 The court expressed
concern here, stating:
(w)e believe a privacy interest is implicated when the government
assembles those diverse pieces of information into a single package and disseminates that package to the public, thereby ensuring
that a person cannot assume anonymity - in this case, preventing
a person's criminal history from fading into obscurity and being
wholly forgotten. Those convicted of crime may not have any cognizable privacy interest inherent in their conviction, but the Notification Law, given the compilation and dissemination of
information, nonetheless implicates a privacy interest. The interest in privacy may fade when the information is a matter of public
record, but it is not non-existent. 150

Despite the court finding a limited privacy interest, it used
factors set out in other cases to determine if the disclosure was
justified by the state in this situation. 15 ' Based on these factors,
145. 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1995). Another case holding the statute
constitutional was E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d. Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998).
146. Id.
147. The defendant in this case also asserted that the registration and/or
notification were punishment and therefore subject to constitutional claims of
violation of ex post facto, double jeopardy, bill of attainder, and cruel and
unusual punishment.
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
149. Doe, 662 A.2d at 409.
150. Id. at 411.
151. The factors used by the court were: 1) the type of records requested; 2) the
information it does or might contain; 3) the potential for harm in any subsequent
nonconsenual disclosure; 4) the injury from disclosure to the relationship in
which the record was generated; 5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent
unauthorized disclosure; 6) the degree of need for access; and 7) whether there is
an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognized
public interest militating toward access. Faison v. Parker, 823 F. Supp. 1198,
1201 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d
570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980)).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol20/iss2/5
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the interest in the state outweighed the defendant's privacy interest because of the strong state interest in public disclosure due to
the high rate of recidivism of sex offenders.152 Key in this determination for the court was the fact that notification was dependent on the risk of re-offense determined by the county
prosecutor. 1 5 3 The court also came to the same conclusion under
the New Jersey Constitution, finding that "the state interest in
protecting the public is legitimate and substantial." 5 4
However, the court found that since the Registration and
Notification Laws "implicate protectible liberty interest in privacy
and in reputation," the defendant was still entitled to procedural
due process.155 The court weighed several factors to determine
that a hearing was required prior to notification under the top
classifications of re-offense 5 6 due to both constitutional considerations and under New Jersey's doctrine of fundamental fairness,
which "serves to protect citizens generally against unjust and
arbitrary governmental action, and specifically against governmental procedures that tend to operate arbitrarily."' 5 7 Therefore,
the court found that a hearing was required before notification
under moderate or high risk levels. 5 '
Another claim by the defendant involved the ex post facto
59
argument. Constitutionally, the New Jersey Registration Act
had notable differences from those previously examined. First, all
convicted sex offenders after the effective date of the statute were
required to register, but only those "whose conduct was found to
be repetitive and compulsive" to register if they were convicted
prior to the enactment of the statute. 60 Second, there was a Community Notification Law' 6 ' that is broken into three tiers:
(1) If risk of re-offense is low, law enforcement agencies likely to
encounter the person registered shall be notified;
152. Doe, 662 A.2d at 411-12.

153. Id. at 412.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 420.
156. These top classifications are Tier II (notification to certain agencies) and
Tier III (public notification) which, as noted earlier, are determined by the county
prosecutor under advisement of law enforcement.
157. Doe, 662 A.2d at 421 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 440.
159. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to 7-5.
160. Doe, 662 A.2d at 377. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(3)(a).
161. § 2C:7-8(c).
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(2) If risk of re-offense is moderate, organizations in the community including schools, religious and youth organizations shall be
notified in accordance with the Attorney General's Guidelines, in
addition to the notice required by paragraph (1) of this subsection;
(3) If risk of re-offense is high, the public shall be notified through
means in accordance with the Attorney General's Guidelines
designed to reach members of the public likely to encounter the
person registered, in addition 16
to2the notice required by paragraphs
(1) and (2) of this subsection.

All registrants, at the very least, had to register under the Tier
1 63
One notification.
As with the previous cases, the Doe court began with a look
into the legislative intent and effect of the statutes. "[W]here the
alleged punitive effect is not intended as such, but rather is an
inevitable consequence of a law that is clearly regulatory, there is
no punishment."1 64 The court stated that "[wihat counts.., is the
purpose and design of the statutory provision, its remedial goal
and purposes, and not the resulting consequential impact, the
'sting of punishment,' that may inevitably, but incidentally, flow
from it."' 65 The court realized that registration may be burdensome, but given the purpose of the statute, it determined that the
minimal inconvenience was too insignificant to constitute
66
punishment.'
Rather than utilizing the Mendoza test to determine if the
statutes had a regulatory or punitive impact, the New Jersey
court stated that "[t] he test of punishment [is] whether the statute
or sanction can 'fairly be characterized' as remedial or punitive
.
"...-167
It expressly rejected the applicability of the Mendoza test
and held that the New Jersey Registration and Notification Acts
are regulatory.' 68 The court stated:
the laws before us today not only have a regulatory purpose, and
solely a regulatory purpose, but also have implementing provisions that are similarly solely regulatory, provisions that are not
excessive but are aimed solely at achieving, and, in fact, are likely
to achieve, that regulatory purpose. The fact that some deterrent
punitive impact may result does not, however, transform those
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

§ 2C:7-8(c).
Doe, 662 A.2d at 378.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 403.
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provisions into 'punishment' if that impact is an inevitable consequence of the regulatory provision, as distinguished from an
provisions that do
impact that results from 'excessive' provisions,
16 9
not advance the regulatory purpose.
Legislative intent, therefore, overrides any minimal punitive
effect that registration and notification may cause.
IV.

PROBLEMS FACING NORTH CAROLINA's AMY JACKSON LAW

In its current state, North Carolina's Amy Jackson law faces
several problems. First, the statute provides the way for vigilantism, where people use the released information to harass the
offender. Second, businesses that hire the offenders may find
themselves in a financial hardship. Finally, and most importantly, the Amy Jackson law faces tough constitutional burdens.
A.

Potential Vigilantism

A major problem with sex offender registration and notification laws is the potential for vigilantism by persons in the community. While the purpose of the law is to protect citizens, there
exists the possibility that a sector of society might use the information to torture and terrorize registered sex offenders that relocate to a certain neighborhood. A study in Oregon recently found
that fewer than 10% of their 237 registered sex offenders experienced harassment because of community notification. 1 70 While
on its face, this appears to be a low number of persons at risk, for
the convicted sex offender this risk is real and frightening. As
noted before, North Carolina convicts 1,100 sex offenders a year
and releases 800 from penal institutions.' 7 ' If the information
reported in Oregon is applied to North Carolina, that means 10%
of 1,100 convicted sex offenders could expect to experience some
harassment because of community notification.
Even if this seems that very few registrants are being
harassed, the experience for these registrants cannot be trivialized. In many cases, the harassment goes beyond just mere verbal
harassment. For example, in Seattle a man's home was burned
169. Doe, 662 A.2d at 405. See also Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1098 ("We conclude

that the Tier 2 and Tier 3 dissemination of information beyond law enforcement
personnel is reasonably related to the nonpunitive goals of Megan's Law.").
170. Report Reveals Little Harassment, Portland Oregonian, April 9, 1995 at

19.
171. Gunter, supra note 7 at 15.
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down when he was identified as a convicted sex offender. 172 This
type of crime, committed by scared and angered citizens, is a possibility here in North Carolina, and law enforcement should be
prepared to deal with any such harassment that occurs.
Conducive to the threat of vigilantism is that under North
Carolina's statute no official means of identifying the person
requesting the information is provided for; nor is the person
required to state the purpose for which he is requesting the information. This leads to the outcome that while there would be a
very accurate record of the sex offender, including his address and
other information, for use in case of the commission of a sex crime,
the same would not be true of the person requesting the information in reference to the sex offender. If a crime were to be committed against the offender, there is no guarantee that the sheriff
would possess sufficient information on the requester to catch the
vigilante. Thus, the same protection given to the public when registering sex offenders, accurate information in case of the commission of a crime, is not available to the sex offender himself.
Furthermore, the fact the offender's picture is public record
could potentially lead to even more cases of vigilantism. For
example, if a sex offender happened to reside with a family member or friend that had the same basic physical description as the
offender, this person may face the risk of being physically
assaulted because of a mistaken identity.
While the protection of the citizenry is a compelling state
interest, this should be balanced with the unfortunate chance that
registrants and possibly innocent people could be victimized
because of the dissemination of this information. A solution to
this problem would be to enact laws making the usage of such
information for the purpose of harassing or assaulting registrants
or others a felony. This would enable the Amy Jackson Law to
fully protect North Carolina children and parents while providing
adequate remedies to those registrants and others who would be
harassed because of its enactment.
B. FinancialHardships in Community
A final problem with community notification in all states is
the potential financial impact on the community. Persons with a
felony conviction, whether or not they served active time in a
penal institution, have a difficult time obtaining employment.
172. NBC

NIGHTLY

NEWS (NBC television broadcast, June 22, 1996).
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Many people would agree that convicted sex offenders should not
be employed by any job that requires interaction with children.
However, the community notification program may keep convicted
sex offenders from maintaining any employment. When the community gains access to information, this information could spread
to the offender's employer, which could possibly lead to the loss of
a job, or even a decline in business. For example, a convicted sex
offender in Rockland County, New York quit his job at a gas station because business was declining. The reason for the decline
was that the community had been notified and had stopped
173
patronizing the business because he was employed there.
Thus, community reaction could lead to the sex offender not being
able to retain employment and then possibly having to be supported by taxpayers. If every county in every state in the United
States had a full community notification program, where would
these people go and how would they survive?
C. Possible ConstitutionalLitigation Facing the Amy Jackson
Law
1 74
Even though Megan's Law was found to be constitutional,
the North Carolina statute may not be as fortunate. The largest
problem with the statute is the disclosure provision. In New
Jersey, community notification was determined by classifications
given to each offender based on his risk of re-offense or potential
threat to the public.' 7 5 The North Carolina statute, however, provides that an individual can write in and request whether anyone
is on the list, regardless of their risk of re-offense. 1 76 Nor is concern given to the likely threats to the public.
The first step that a court will take will be to look at the legislative purpose:

to assist law enforcement agencies' efforts to protect communities
by requiring persons who are convicted of sex offenses or of certain
other offenses committed against minors to register with law
enforcement agencies, to require the exchange of relevant information about those offenders among law enforcement agencies,
173.
News,
174.
175.
176.

Gene Warner, Public Not Fully Protected By Sex-Offender Law, Buffalo
July 20, 1996 at Al.
Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1995).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8 (West 1994).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.10 (Supp. 1997).
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and to authorize the access to necessary and relevant information
about those offenders to others .... 177
The Legislative purpose is clearly set forth as regulatory; therefore resort to the Mendoza analysis is unnecessary. The effect of
the statutes would still be a key factor in determining the constitutionality of the statutes, because a large punitive effect can
178
overturn the stated intent of the legislature.
In analyzing whether the statute's effect is punitive, it is beneficial to re-examine how other courts have treated statutes with
1 79
clearly regulatory purposes. The statute in Illinois v. Adams
80
prohibited dissemination of offender information to the public.1
Regarding the effect of the statute, the court in Adams said that
no stigma attached to the offender, because the information was
kept confidential on pain of criminal sanctions.' 8 ' In addition, the
offender retained all constitutional rights against any unwarranted police harassment. 182 The statute was found to be
constitutional.
Also found constitutional was New Hampshire's statute, in
New Hampshire v. Costello. s8 The statute, similar to that
involved in Adams, required the offender information to remain
confidential.18 Because the intent of the legislature was clearly
regulatory, and because the statute did not impose greater punishment, the statute was upheld.
New Jersey's Megan's Law also involved a statute evidencing
a clear, regulatory intent. This statute placed certain restrictions
on the dissemination of information. 8 5 As for any punitive effect,
the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that such effect was an
inevitable consequence of the regulatory aspect of the statute, and
that mere punitive effect does not automatically transform a statute into punishment.' 8 6
177. § 14-208.5.
178. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 250 (1980) (citing Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617-21 (1960)).
179. 581 N.E.2d 637 (Ill. 1991).
180. Id. at 640 (citing former Illinois law now codified at 730 Ill. Comp. Stat.
150/9 (West 1997)).
181. Id. at 641.
182. Id.
183. 643 A.2d 531 (N.H. 1994).
184. Id. at 533 (citing N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 632-A:17 (1992)).
185. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-5 (West 1994).
186. Costello, 643 A.2d at 533.
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In Washington v. Ward,81

7

the legislative intent was clearly

regulatory.s 8

Although the Mendoza factors were not mandatory
due to the regulatory intent of the legislature, the court used them
as a guide in examining the effect of the statute.' 8 9 The statute
authorized the release of "relevant and necessary information
regarding sex offenders to the public when the release of the information is necessary for public protection." 190 The Ward court,
using the Mendoza factors, found the Washington registration
statute to be constitutional.
Another case using the Mendoza factors was Arizona v.
Noble, 191 because the legislative intent, unlike the others, was not
clear. In Noble, 192 the court placed emphasis on the importance of
the statutory limitations restricting public access to information
to circumstances that serve a clearly regulatory purpose. 93 The
Noble court found the statute constitutional.
In all of the above cases, the limitation or denial of dissemination was a factor to be considered when determining if the statute
constituted additional punishment outside of that which the
defendant was sentenced to serve. It is important that all of these
statutes placed some restrictions on the dissemination of
information.
North Carolina's statute, on the other hand, states that "[alny
person may obtain a copy of an individual's registration form...
by submitting a written request for the information to the sheriff."' 94 Granted, the public is not being notified, as in New
Jersey's statute, but there does not appear to be any limitation on
who can obtain a copy of the registration form. If released, the
information would lose all confidentiality. Possibly, the court
could interpret the "necessary" and "relevant" language in the
statute's expressed purpose' 95 to carry over into a requirement for
access. However, the clear "any person" language indicates that
1 96
there are no such requirements.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

869 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1994).
Id. at 1069.
Id.
Id. at 1070 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.550(1) (Supp. 1998)).
829 P.2d 1217 (Ariz. 1992).
Id.
Id. at 1222.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.10(b) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
§ 14-208.5.
§ 14-208.10(b).
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Should this be considered additional punishment placed upon
an individual who has already served his sentence, or is it merely
a regulatory precaution to protect society from those who statistically are likely to strike again? Whether the courts will view this
statutory provision as too broad is unknown at this time. However, it certainly provides a strong basis for the defendant to begin
his argument.
Further support for an offender's argument is that the statute
provides that the offender's name, sex, address, physical description, picture, conviction date, offense, and sentence are "public record and shall be available for public inspection."197 Again, while
matters of public record are not confidential, it is questionable as
to whether placing the entire registry in the public record will
obviate challenges to the statute. Other jurisdictions seem to set
forth the notion that confidentiality, even if limited, serves the
purpose of maintaining the intended regulatory intent of the

statute.198
It is important for North Carolina to carefully examine how
other sex offender registration statutes have withstood constitutional attack. Equally important is to recognize the differences
that currently exist in North Carolina's Amy Jackson Law and to
take a good look at the challenges to its validity that are currently
available.
V.

CONCLUSION

When looking at the Amy Jackson law in comparison to the
sex offender statutes in other states, several shortcomings are
apparent. However, due to the expressed purpose underlying the
statute, North Carolina courts will make all efforts to uphold the
constitutionality of the registration statutes. On the one hand,
registration can serve a beneficial purpose in North Carolina communities and aid law enforcement agencies. The compilation of
registration information will aid law enforcement authorities, and
dissemination will likely aid communities in protecting themselves and their children. On the other hand, however, one must
not forget the threat of vigilantism. Furthermore, although the
recidivism rate for sex offenders is high, there are still many who
are trying to start their life over.
197. § 14-208.10(a).
198. See Section III of this comment.
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It seems reasonable that a line be drawn somewhere. Possibly the statute will be interpreted so as to require the information
sought to be "necessary and relevant." If so, that limitation will
probably preserve the constitutionality of the statute. However, if
anyone may request information about an individual and freely
disseminate that to others, the statute begins to take the face of
punishment.
Because of the statute's current form, North Carolina should
expect tough legal challenges to the validity of its Amy Jackson
Law. Using jurisprudence from other states as a guide, a court
might just find the North Carolina law unconstitutional.
Nikki Gfellers
Kimberly Ann Lewis
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